Oil, Power and Pretence in the Age of Trump’s West Asia Conflict

The old saying goes: old habits die hard. It is an apt description of political stubbornness — and few leaders embody it quite like Donald Trump. Even when events refuse to cooperate, the performance of authority continues. The declarations remain grand; the reality, increasingly complicated.

Take the present confrontation with Iran. Washington appeared to assume that Tehran could be coerced the way weaker economies have been pressured in the past, such as Venezuela. But Iran is not Venezuela. For more than two decades it has prepared precisely for such a confrontation — militarily, economically, and politically. Its power structure is unusual: the elected president operates under the authority of the Supreme Leader, currently Khamenei, and the formidable Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps answers directly to him rather than to the civilian government. That arrangement ensures that external pressure rarely produces quick surrender.

Even while Iranian leaders spoke conciliatory words to their neighbours, warning them about allowing American bases in their territory, events on the ground moved in a different direction. Strikes and counter-strikes continued. Airports in the Gulf — including the one in Dubai — experienced disruptions, and flights briefly halted again after fresh attacks. In Iran’s system, the IRGC does not always move in step with the diplomatic tone of the elected president, and that ambiguity is part of Tehran’s strategic design.

Meanwhile the world’s most sensitive energy chokepoint — the Strait of Hormuz — has become the stage on which this drama unfolds. Roughly 20 percent of the world’s oil passes through this narrow passage. If tankers hesitate to sail or insurers refuse coverage, the market suddenly loses tens of millions of barrels a day in perceived supply. Prices, already hovering around $85 per barrel, begin to invite predictions of $150 or even higher.

For Washington this is not merely a geopolitical issue; it is a domestic political one. Rising fuel prices have a habit of punishing American presidents. Approval ratings that are already under pressure can sink further the moment gasoline prices rise at the pump. That reality explains why the conversation quietly turned toward an unexpected player — India.

Signals began emerging that India could help stabilize the market by continuing to purchase large quantities of Russian crude. The idea was simple: India would buy discounted oil from Russia, refine it in its massive refining system, and export petroleum products to energy-starved regions such as Europe. Washington’s language suggested that it had “allowed” such purchases through waivers. Yet New Delhi never actually signed any agreement promising to stop buying Russian oil in the first place.

In reality, India had already been importing roughly a million barrels per day from Russia — about thirty million barrels in a month — and contracts for subsequent months were expected to be even larger. The suggestion that such purchases were happening because America had graciously granted permission was therefore a curious piece of diplomatic theatre.

The domestic debate in India added another layer. Critics argued that the government had compromised sovereignty by accommodating Washington. Yet the same critics rarely recall that the United States has maintained a major strategic base for decades at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean — a presence dating back half a century — without provoking comparable outrage at the time.

Recent maritime episodes further complicated the picture. An Iranian naval vessel reportedly sought refuge at Cochin Port in India after hostilities escalated, while another Iranian ship had earlier been attacked near Galle Port off the southern tip of Sri Lanka. Such incidents illustrate how quickly regional tensions can spill into the broader Indian Ocean theatre.

The larger arithmetic of energy is stark. The world consumes roughly 100 million barrels of oil a day. Remove 15–20 million barrels from circulation through disruptions in the Gulf, and prices could spiral rapidly. Only a few countries possess the capacity to cushion such shocks — notably Russia, China and India, each with significant reserves, refining capacity, or strategic flexibility.

This emerging trio represents a quiet shift in global energy power. When markets tremble, it is increasingly these countries that hold the levers capable of stabilizing supply. Western producers and traditional oil alliances suddenly appear less decisive than they once seemed.

And so the paradox of the moment becomes clear. The United States still speaks in the language of command, but the global energy system is gradually moving toward a more distributed balance of power. Orders are issued, waivers are announced, and permissions are proclaimed — yet behind the scenes, cooperation is quietly sought.

The proverb, therefore, remains perfectly suited to the age. Old habits die hard. And the old swagger of unquestioned authority — still refuses to straighten.