For RSS, National Interest Has Never Been BJP First

Political parties think in election cycles. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) claims to think in civilisational time. Whether one accepts that claim or not, it helps explain why the RSS has often viewed national events differently from the political parties that emerge from its ideological family.

That distinction is most evident in the debates surrounding the 1984 Lok Sabha election.

To understand 1984, one must first understand Punjab. The state was in the grip of militancy. Terror had become part of everyday life. Lala Jagat Narain, founder-editor of Punjab Kesari, was assassinated in 1981 for his uncompromising stand against separatism.

Three years later, his son and editor, Ramesh Chander, was also assassinated. Hundreds of Hindu civilians were killed in terrorist attacks, while thousands of Sikhs, security personnel and ordinary citizens lost their lives during the years of violence. The fear that gripped Punjab found expression in later books and films, including Sutlej, which portrays the human cost of terrorism.

The crisis reached its peak when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by two of her Sikh bodyguards following Operation Blue Star. India was shaken. Punjab was burning. National security became the defining issue of the day. It was against this backdrop that an unusual political narrative emerged.

Journalist Neerja Chowdhury, in How Prime Ministers Decide, writes that RSS functionaries, including Bhaurao Deoras, met Rajiv Gandhi's associates several times before the 1984 election and that senior RSS ideologue Nanaji Deshmukh urged support for Rajiv Gandhi.

Journalist Rasheed Kidwai has also written that there were multiple meetings between Rajiv Gandhi's circle and RSS leaders and that sections of the RSS cadre backed the Congress during the election.

The RSS has never officially confirmed these accounts, and historians continue to debate their extent and significance. Yet the story has endured because it raises an uncomfortable possibility—that in moments of extraordinary national crisis, the RSS may have considered political stability more important than immediate partisan rivalry.

The BJP itself was hardly a factor then. Formed only in 1980, it was still experimenting with "Gandhian Socialism" and had little electoral strength. In the sympathy wave that followed Indira Gandhi's assassination, it was reduced to just two Lok Sabha seats.

Political commentator Bhau Torsekar argues that many within the RSS were not fully invested in the BJP at that stage. According to him, the RSS has historically viewed itself as a cultural organisation capable of making tactical political choices when it believes national interests require them, even if those choices do not immediately benefit the BJP.

Whether one agrees with that interpretation or not, Punjab has once again become central to India's strategic thinking.

The circumstances are different. The insurgency has ended. Democratic institutions are stronger. Yet Punjab remains India's most sensitive western border state. Cross-border drone incursions, narcotics trafficking, organised crime and the activities of overseas pro-Khalistan groups continue to dominate the national security conversation. Geography has not changed. Nor has Punjab's strategic importance.

That is also why Union Home Minister Amit Shah has made Punjab central to the Centre's internal security narrative. He has repeatedly declared that Left Wing Extremism is nearing its end and has promised to dismantle the drug networks that earned Punjab the label "Udta Punjab". These are not merely administrative targets; they are political commitments.

The real political test in Punjab may not be who drafts the most attractive manifesto. It may be who convinces voters that the state can be made secure, drug-free and economically stable. Amit Shah has placed his political credibility behind that promise. Whether Punjab's electorate accepts that proposition will ultimately be decided at the ballot box.

But Punjab has never been an ordinary election. It has often been the state where national security, identity and politics collide. That is why the debates surrounding 1984 continue to matter, not because they conclusively tell us what happened, but because they force us to ask how organisations with long-term strategic ambitions think when the nation faces exceptional challenges.

The real question, therefore, is not whether the RSS will stand with the BJP. The real question is how the RSS defines national interest when Punjab once again becomes a strategic frontier. History suggests that when the Sangh answers that question, elections become only one chapter in a much larger story.