Dipke-Ranka: Civil Society Doesn’t Come With a Government ID

The controversy involving Dipke and Ranka of the CJP is larger than an altercation over the attempted inspection of a government school. Beneath it lies a fundamental question of constitutional democracy: Can those who claim to speak for civil society also assume the powers of the State?

There is nothing undemocratic about citizens questioning government. Parents can question a school's functioning, students can protest, teachers can complain and civil-society organisations can expose administrative failure. They can demand records, seek accountability, mobilise public opinion and approach courts. But democracy rests on a distinction that cannot be erased in the name of activism: the right to question authority is not the right to exercise authority.

If citizens believe a government school is being badly administered, they can demand an inspection. They can seek information under the law, approach education officials, organise parents, protest peacefully or go to court. What they cannot do merely by declaring themselves civil society is confer upon themselves the statutory powers of a government inspector. This is not a defence of officialdom. It is a defence of constitutionalism.

The State functions because public power is distributed through institutions and limited by law. Legislatures make laws, the executive administers them, designated officials exercise designated powers and courts adjudicate disputes. Citizens scrutinise all of them. That separation is not bureaucratic inconvenience. It is the protection against arbitrary power.

The modern temptation is to believe that moral authority can substitute for legal authority. It cannot. An activist may genuinely expose governmental failure. A journalist may uncover corruption. A citizen may be entirely correct about an injustice. Yet being right about a wrong does not automatically confer the power to enforce the remedy. The diagnosis of governmental failure does not create governmental authority.

This principle matters far beyond one school. Today, one organisation may claim the right to inspect a school. Tomorrow, another may decide to inspect a police station. A third may demand access to hospital records. Another may enter a government office seeking files. If every group can invoke public interest as its warrant, who decides who has the authority to act? That is precisely why constitutional government creates procedures.

The Right to Information Act gives citizens powerful means to scrutinise the State, but it does so through a lawful mechanism. The procedure does not weaken the citizen's power; the procedure makes the power legitimate. Constitutional government is often slower than direct action precisely because it is designed to prevent power from becoming arbitrary.

Civil society is a watchdog. It is not a parallel government. A watchdog can expose wrongdoing, alert the public and force institutions to respond. But it does not become the police because the police have failed. It does not become the court because justice is slow. It does not become the government because the government is inefficient. The moment the watchdog assumes the powers of the institution it watches, it ceases to be a watchdog.

There is also a simple political test. Would those defending self-appointed authority accept the same principle if political identities were reversed? Suppose activists of another ideological persuasion entered a government institution and declared: “We are civil society. We are here to inspect the records.” Would that too be called democratic accountability, or would it suddenly become trespass and intimidation? A principle that changes with political convenience is not a principle.

There is, however, no justification for violence. If Dipke and Ranka were assaulted, manhandled or had their clothes torn, those allegations must be investigated. Rejecting self-appointed authority cannot become a licence for mob justice. One illegality cannot legitimise another. If activists exceeded lawful authority, the remedy is law. If they were assaulted, the remedy is also law. That is the difference between constitutional democracy and street justice.

India needs a stronger civil society, not a weaker one. But its strength must come from making the State answerable—not from becoming the State. File the RTI, document the failure, organise parents, mobilise public opinion, protest peacefully, approach the competent authority and go to court. Use every constitutional instrument available. But do not convert the moral authority of citizenship into an imaginary statutory authority.

Because once that happens, one question inevitably follows: Who will watch the watchdog? A government can be voted out, an official can be disciplined, an order can be challenged in court and administrative failure can be exposed by the media. But who holds a self-appointed authority accountable? That is why parallel authority is not a higher form of democracy. It is a challenge to constitutional democracy.

Citizens must always have the power to question the State, but they must not assume the power to become the State. That is the line between democratic accountability and self-appointed rule.